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ESSAY
MORAL COMMITMENTS IN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Eric A. Posner* and Cass R. Sunstein†
The regulatory state has become a cost-benefit state, in the sense that
under prevailing executive orders, agencies must catalogue the costs
and benefits of regulations before issuing them, and in general, must
show that their benefits justify their costs. Agencies have wellestablished tools for valuing risks to health, safety, and the
environment. Sometimes, however, regulations are designed to protect
moral values, and agencies struggle to quantify those values; on
important occasions, they ignore them. That is a mistake. People may
care deeply about such values, and they suffer a welfare loss when
moral values are compromised. If so, the best way to measure that
welfare loss is through eliciting private willingness to pay. Of course,
it is true that some moral commitments cannot be counted in costbenefit analysis because the law rules them off-limits. It is also true
that the principal reason to protect moral values is not to prevent
welfare losses to those who care about those values. But from the
welfarist standpoint, those losses matter, and they might turn out to be
very large. Agencies should take them into account. If they fail to do
so, they might well be acting arbitrarily and hence in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act. These claims raise fundamental issues
in legal and political theory about welfarism and its limits, and they
also bear on a wide variety of issues, including protection of
foreigners, of victims of mass atrocities, of children, of rape victims, of
disabled people, of future generations, and of animals.
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I. THE THESIS
Consider the following cases:
1. Congress has directed the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) to issue a regulation to ensure
disclosure of “conflict minerals”—minerals used to finance
mass atrocities.1 The SEC is required to catalogue the costs
and benefits of its regulation (to the extent feasible). It is
aware that many consumers are interested in the relevant
information. How, if at all, should the SEC monetize that
interest?
2. The Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act2 provides
labeling standards for tuna products. It includes standards by

1

See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,275–77 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b).
2
16 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012).
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which companies may label their products “dolphin safe.”3
Many consumers care a great deal about the protection of
dolphins and want to see those labels. How, if at all, should
the Department of Agriculture incorporate that concern in
issuing standards? Should it attempt to monetize it?
3. Many consumers are concerned about genetically modified
(“GM”) food.4 While some of them are concerned about the
effect of GM food on health and the environment, others
believe that genetic modification of food is “just wrong.”
Congress has required the Department of Agriculture to label
GM food as such.5 How, if at all, should the Department take
account of consumer sentiment in cataloging the rule’s
benefits?
In some important contexts, governments regulate products because
some or many people believe that their production is immoral, or at least
morally problematic. The regulation might involve protection of
children, of people in other nations, of victims of some kind of
wrongdoing, of animals, or even of nature.6 In most cases, their
production involves concrete harms, such as lives lost, which are what
trigger the moral concern. The goal of regulation—whether it is a
mandate, a ban, or a labeling requirement—is to reduce those harms.
In some cases, it is difficult or perhaps impossible to identify concrete
harms, but people nonetheless favor regulation as a way of expressing
and realizing their moral commitments (as in the context of GM food).
Yet regulators are normally required to perform cost-benefit analysis
whenever they issue a major regulation, and cost-benefit analysis
requires the regulator to identify and monetize all harms and benefits.

3

Id. § 1385(d).
See Sydney E. Scott et al., Evidence for Absolute Moral Opposition to Genetically
Modified Food in the United States, 11 Persp. on Psychol. Sci. 315, 316 (2016).
5
National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Pub. L. No. 114-216, §239, 130 Stat.
834 (2016) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1639b (Supp. 2017)).
6
See, e.g., Denis Swords, Case Note, Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior: A
Contingent Step Forward for Environmentalists, 51 La. L. Rev. 1347 (1991) (discussing
practical and theoretical conflicts in natural resource valuation in the context of Department
of the Interior regulations and relevant case law). On the theoretical issues, see Robert E.
Goodin, Green Political Theory 19–83 (1992).
4
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Our principal question here is how regulators should take account of
moral commitments in undertaking cost-benefit analysis.
Our simple answer, put too briefly, is that on welfarist grounds, moral
commitments can matter, and that when people would suffer a welfare
loss when their moral commitments are violated, regulators should ask:
how much are people willing to pay to honor those commitments? We
acknowledge that this answer is jarring because the question of what
morality requires is usually not answered by asking how much people
are willing to pay to promote their moral commitments. (The more
natural way to proceed is to ask what morality actually requires.) We
agree that, from a welfarist perspective or otherwise, the willingness-topay question is hardly the only one. Nonetheless, we urge that, from a
welfarist perspective, it is both relevant and important to answer, at least
when violations of moral commitments would produce welfare losses.7
Suppose, for example, that a consumer, John, cares greatly about an
assortment of things, including his longevity, his health, his comfort,
and the well-being of dolphins. Suppose that a substantial component of
his welfare depends on the welfare of dolphins. If they suffer, he suffers.
But how much does he suffer? Here as elsewhere, and whatever its
limitations,8 his willingness to pay is the best available measure.
An alternative view is that, even though they matter, moral
commitments should not be taken to be part of a cost-benefit analysis;
they raise entirely independent issues and must be engaged seriously but
separately.9 On that view, analysis of costs and benefits is important but
7
A clarification: when people are willing to pay something to prevent a violation of a
moral commitment, it may not be in order to prevent the welfare loss that they would
themselves feel if the moral commitment were violated. It may be to protect the moral
commitment alone. After all, they may feel no welfare loss when the moral commitment is
violated. Nonetheless, we suspect that normally people feel welfare losses when their moral
commitments are violated, and hence that their willingness to pay is normally the best proxy
for the welfare loss that they would experience.
8
For one discussion of those limitations, see Peter Dorman, Markets and Mortality:
Economics, Dangerous Work, and the Value of Human Life 89–93 (1996).
9
See Donald H. Rosenthal & Robert H. Nelson, Why Existence Value Should Not Be
Used in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 11 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 116 (1992). Rosenthal and
Nelson argue that cost-benefit analysis should not take into account “existence” (or
“nonuse”) value, which is the willingness to pay for a state of the world that does not directly
affect well-being. Id. at 117. The concept is similar to what we mean by moral effects. Their
reason is that existence value is incoherent and very difficult to measure. For a rebuttal, see
Raymond J. Kopp, Why Existence Value Should Be Used in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 11 J.
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not exhaustive; it turns on a narrower set of factors, such as effects on
income and health.10 It is true that moral commitments often signal
values that are not adequately captured by private willingness to pay. If
the goal is to prevent mass atrocities in a foreign country, Americans’
willingness to pay to prevent mass atrocities hardly exhausts the welfare
effects of preventing mass atrocities. But in response, we emphasize that
people’s welfare may well be affected and even profoundly affected by
the realization or frustration of their moral commitments, as
demonstrated by willingness to pay. If people lose welfare because of
the suffering or death of others—refugees, people in other countries,
their own children, rape victims, dolphins, members of future
generations—their loss ought to be counted.
To be sure, the welfare loss might be hard to measure,11 and in many
cases, it might turn out to be relatively or even trivially small, not least
because people’s budget constraints might mean that they are unwilling
to spend a great deal to vindicate any particular moral commitment. But
in principle, there is no justification for refusing to include, in a costbenefit analysis, people’s willingness to pay to protect such
commitments. If an agency ignores the resulting number, and thus treats
people’s moral concerns as valueless, there is a strong argument that it is
acting arbitrarily and therefore in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act or other law.12 The resulting regulation will be too weak.
The issue is hardly fanciful. For example, people have strong moral
commitments that bear on policies involving refugees, immigrants,
climate change, police brutality, and prison rape, and when officials go
in one direction or another, many of them suffer serious welfare losses.
A more mundane issue, directly raising our question, arose several years
Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 123 (1992). See also Tom Crowards, Nonuse Values and the
Environment: Economic and Ethical Motivations, 6 Envtl. Values 143 (1997) (discussing the
debate and proposing that regulators develop limits on the use of existence values). We agree
with Kopp that the concept of existence value is not incoherent and that existence values are,
in principle, measurable, and should be used in cost-benefit analysis. We hope to bring the
debate among economists down to earth by evaluating the actual ways in which regulatory
agencies approach these problems.
10
That is the focus of standard discussions. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Risk
Policy: The 1996 Arne Ryde Memorial Lectures 69–83 (1998).
11
On some of the challenges and potential solutions in an especially difficult context, see
Sean Hannon Williams, Statistical Children, 30 Yale J. on Reg. 63 (2013).
12
See Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 478–80 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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ago when the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) issued
regulations designed largely to protect fish from being sucked into
power plant systems and killed (“impingement and entrainment”).13
On standard assumptions, the direct benefits of such protection in
terms of human welfare—perhaps in the form of ecological benefits and
improved recreation—are relatively small.14 In part for this reason, the
EPA’s regulations were highly flexible and far less stringent than they
might have been.15 But it has been vigorously urged that apart from
those standard benefits, people would be willing to pay something more
to provide such protection because they care about protecting fish—and
that once that figure is aggregated across the population and included in
the benefits figure, aggressive regulation (far more aggressive than EPA
was willing to promulgate) is amply justified.16 If people’s willingness
to pay would reflect the welfare losses that they would suffer if the fish
were not protected, then there is a real argument that it should count in
the calculus.
The role of moral commitments has arisen in other contexts as well.
Indeed, a court of appeals struck down a damage measure, from the
Department of the Interior, that refused to consider people’s willingness
to pay to protect the continued existence of pristine areas and the
animals that live there.17 In the court’s view, it was unlawful for the
agency to focus entirely on use value and to ignore private willingness to
pay that would depend, in that case, on moral considerations.18 That
conclusion has potentially broad implications, suggesting that in certain
contexts, a refusal to use contingent valuation methods to account for
13

See 40 C.F.R. § 125.90–98; see also National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—
Final Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing
Facilities and Amend Requirements at Phase I Facilities, 79 Fed. Reg. 48,300, 48,303 (Aug.
15, 2014) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 125) (describing the harm to aquatic life caused by
existing facilities and the intended benefits of the regulations to fish).
14
The EPA so concluded in issuing the regulation at issue in Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 224–26 (2009).
15
See 40 C.F.R. § 125.90–98.
16
Frank Ackerman & Elizabeth A. Stanton, Comment Letter on Regulation of Cooling
Water Intake Structures at Existing Facilities (Aug. 18, 2011), https://www.regulations.gov/
contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OW-2008-0667-2568&attachmentNumber=1&
contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/VMW4-9JMB].
17
Ohio v. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 462–64.
18
See id.
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“existence value”19—reflecting the value of the continued existence of a
wilderness beyond its utility for recreation and food—would be arbitrary
and, therefore, unlawful.
We do not mean to take a stand on the controversy over the
usefulness and reliability of contingent valuation methods here,20 and
our claim is emphatically not meant to suggest that willingness to pay
captures all of the welfare benefits of regulations that are designed to
protect third parties. The ultimate goal of the Dolphin Protection
Consumer Information Act is to protect dolphins, not John. But insofar
as John’s welfare is increased by the protection of dolphins, his
willingness to pay is part of the cost-benefit analysis. Though valuation
of third parties is not our principal topic here, and presents independent
challenges, we shall have something to say about it in due course.
We have acknowledged that our suggestion is jarring, but in
prominent cases, government regulators have essentially accepted it. In a
regulation involving building access for people who use wheelchairs,
regulators emphasized that, if the average (nondisabled) American was
willing to pay a very small amount to increase such access, the
regulation would have benefits in excess of costs.21 On the regulators’
view, that willingness to pay was relevant to the assessment of whether
the regulation was justified. In a regulation designed to reduce the
incidence of prison rape, regulators used a contingent valuation study to
find that (unimprisoned) Americans would pay over $300,000 to
eliminate a case of prison rape, and added that in light of that number,

19
See John Quiggin, Existence Value and the Contingent Valuation Method, 37 Austl.
Econ. Papers 312, 314–16 (1998). We are assuming that existence value captures the welfare
losses to people who care about the continued existence of (say) an endangered species. It is
possible that some people are willing to pay to protect a moral commitment (including
commitment to existence value) even though they would not suffer a welfare loss if that
commitment were violated. Imagine, for example, someone who lacks any emotional
commitment to dolphins, or any affective investment in them, but who believes, on principle,
that welfare losses should be minimized. Such a person may have a moral commitment to
dolphins, and be willing to pay to protect them, but may also suffer no welfare loss if they
suffer or die. In our view, that person’s willingness to pay for existence value ought not to
count on welfare grounds.
20
For skeptical views, see Jerry Hausman, Contingent Valuation: From Dubious to
Hopeless, 26 J. Econ. Persp., Fall 2012, at 43; Daniel Kahneman & Jack L. Knetsch, Valuing
Public Goods: The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction, 22 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 57 (1992).
21
See infra Section III.E.
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the regulation likely had benefits in excess of costs.22 In a case involving
protection of children from backover crashes, the Department of
Transportation pointed to, without monetizing, parents’ desire to provide
that protection.23 And in response to the court of appeals decision noted
above, the Department of the Interior acknowledged the importance of
considering existence value in assessing natural resource damages.24
To be sure, these are unusual regulations, for which calculation of
benefits was especially challenging, thus creating an incentive for
creativity. But if our analysis is correct, regulators were on the right
track in all four cases, at least insofar as they were concerned about the
welfare losses that would occur if people’s moral commitments were
violated25—and their approach has more general implications for
valuation of regulatory benefits.
The question of how to address people’s moral commitments in costbenefit analysis is of great importance, and not only because so many
regulations advance moral goals. The problem for agencies is that, when
Congress commands them to advance such goals, it rarely provides
guidance about the precise level of stringency, or more particularly, of
the costs that should be imposed on the private sector in the course of
achieving those goals. The SEC calculated that its conflict minerals
regulation would cost the industry about $5 billion, and in light of the
statutory mandate, it deemed that amount a reasonable price to pay in
order to enhance disclosure of conflict minerals use.26 But what if a
slightly more effective regulation, also in compliance with the
underlying statute, would have cost $50 billion or $500 billion? What if
22

See infra Section III.D.
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Rear Visibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 19,178, 19,235–
36 (Apr. 7, 2014) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571); see also infra Section III.C (discussing
methods to monetize parents’ willingness to pay to eliminate statistical risks faced by their
children).
24
Natural Resource Damages for Hazardous Substances, 73 Fed. Reg. 57,259, 57,261
(Oct. 2, 2008) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11). For a defense of the use of the existence value
approach in federal preservation regulation and a general discussion, see David A. Dana,
Existence Value and Federal Preservation Regulation, 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 343 (2004).
25
In the case of parental concern or their children’s welfare, of course, the welfare loss to
parents outruns the violation of the moral commitment; it is the loss of the child that is
primary.
26
See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,333–36 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b).
23
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a slightly less effective regulation, again in compliance with the
underlying statute, would have cost $1 billion or $2 billion? Should the
SEC have imposed huge costs on the private sector in order to improve
disclosure by only a small amount?
Critics of cost-benefit analysis, who claim that moral gains are not
monetizable and, therefore, that agencies should not use cost-benefit
analysis at all,27 have not given satisfactory answers to such questions.
We argue that, if agencies monetize the welfare losses that come from
violation of moral commitments, they will be in a better position to
decide on the stringency of regulations in a nonarbitrary way. In some
cases, monetization of moral benefits will justify stronger regulations.
Concrete though it is, our argument turns out to touch directly on
some of the most abstract and fundamental issues in legal and political
theory.28 If cost-benefit analysis must take on board all moral
commitments for which people are willing to pay—empathetic,
exclusionary, or sadistic—it will take on board a great deal. Indeed,
there might seem to be no logical stopping point. The universe of moral
commitments is very wide, in the sense that people would be willing to
pay to maintain or to alter numerous and diverse states of affairs, and
they would suffer a welfare loss if many states of affairs were
maintained or altered. People’s moral commitments bear on business
activity on Sunday, kissing in public, boxing, sexually explicit speech,
political dissent, consumption of meat, and same-sex relationships. Must
regulators consider all of those commitments?
The simplest answer is that some moral commitments, such as belief
in racial segregation or suppression of sexually explicit speech, are
inconsistent with the Constitution or with statutes authorizing regulatory
action; it is legitimate for regulators to conclude that those commitments
cannot be counted in the analysis, even if they are backed by willingness
to pay. As a limitation on the reach of our argument, some people might
also insist on ideas, associated with the liberal political tradition, that
forbid interference with (what is seen as) purely self-regarding behavior

27

See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of
Everything and the Value of Nothing 117–22 (2004).
28
For relevant perspectives, see generally John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in The Basic
Writings of John Stuart Mill 1 (2002), and Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian
Liberal, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 152 (1970).
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by reference to the moral concerns of outsiders.29 For example, people
might be willing to pay something to stop same-sex marriages, uses of
contraceptives, sales of alcohol, and indoor tanning. Welfarists may or
may not be willing to take account of third-party preferences of this
kind,30 but it is possible to embrace the thrust of our argument—in favor
of considering welfare losses that come from violations of moral
commitments—while also insisting on that restriction on its domain.
We note as well that some moral commitments operate at an
exceedingly high level of generality, as when people suffer or rejoice as
a result of the very fact of regulation. On strict welfarist principles, such
commitments should be counted. But it seems safe to say that regulators
ought to ignore them on the ground that the analysis becomes too
unruly, and too untethered, if they are taken into account. In due course,
we shall explore all of these arguments.
The remainder of this Essay is as follows. In Part II, we begin by
reviewing the moral foundations of cost-benefit analysis. That form of
analysis is best understood as a decision procedure for advancing
welfare; it does not directly advance nonwelfarist goals. But we also
show that, to the extent that society’s failure to vindicate nonwelfarist
moral commitments affects the well-being of the public, cost-benefit
analysis can and should capture that effect, at least in principle. In Part
III, we apply our method to a heterogeneous array of real-world areas of
regulation that bear on important moral values: conflict minerals and
mass atrocities; GMOs; mortality risks faced by children; prison rape;
access for disabled people; and climate change. Part IV explores legal
issues. A brief conclusion follows.

29

See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 400–30 (1990). We acknowledge the
complication that our argument introduces: if people suffer as a result of (say) same-sex
marriages or doing business on Sunday, such marriages and such business activity are not
purely self-regarding. The notion of self-regarding action, and category of “harm to others,”
is ordinarily defined by ruling certain welfare losses (above all, the losses to those who
suffer on moral grounds) irrelevant.
30
See Sen, supra note 28, at 155–57.
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II. THEORY
A. Welfarism and Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cost-benefit analysis is a decision procedure used by regulatory
agencies to evaluate regulations.31 Congress often gives agencies
discretion whether to promulgate regulations in order to promote
statutory goals, and even when Congress eliminates such discretion,
agencies often have discretion with respect to levels of stringency. To
promote accountability and transparency, prevailing Executive Orders
require agencies (other than independent agencies) to catalogue costs
and benefits even when consideration of costs is forbidden by statute at
the time of decision.32
To provide two of countless examples of statutes under which costbenefit analysis is undertaken, the EPA is authorized under different
statutes to issue regulations that are “appropriate and necessary”33 and
that eliminate “unreasonable risk.”34 It is possible to read these
apparently open-ended standards, at least in the abstract, as giving the
EPA considerable freedom to decide on the appropriate level of
stringency with reference to costs and benefits.35 Beginning in the
Reagan administration, the White House has required the EPA and other
executive agencies (1) to catalogue costs and benefits, (2) to
demonstrate that regulatory benefits outweigh or justify regulatory costs,
and (3) to maximize net benefits, in order to ensure that the regulations
are justified.36 President Reagan’s defining executive order makes costbenefit analysis the rule of decision “to the extent permitted by law.”37

31
See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis 2
(2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: Humanizing the Regulatory State 2–3 (2014)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Valuing Life]; Viscusi, supra note 10, at 102–05. On some of the
theoretical complexities, see Matthew D. Adler, Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond
Cost-Benefit Analysis 88–113 (2012).
32
See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012).
33
42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012).
34
See, e.g., id. § 2077(d).
35
For a conclusion to this effect in a related context, see American Trucking Ass’ns v.
EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1037–38 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
36
See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128–29 (1982).
37
Id. at 128.
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That idea has been accepted and renewed, with variations not relevant
here, by every president through President Trump.38
In important cases, federal courts have also held that, when taken
together with the Administrative Procedure Act, prominent statutes,
including those that set out both of the foregoing standards, require that
regulations are justified by at least some form of cost-benefit analysis.39
Indeed, eight of the nine current members of the Supreme Court have
concluded that, in the face of statutory ambiguity, agencies must
consider costs as well as benefits and thus engage in a kind of costbenefit balancing.40 If an agency fails to consider costs at all, or if the
benefits cannot be seen to justify the costs, its decision might well be
invalidated as arbitrary.41
What accounts for the bipartisan (though admittedly not universal42)
appeal of cost-benefit analysis? The simplest answer is that human
38
See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601; Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601. As of this
writing, President Trump has not modified these Executive Orders, and hence they remain in
effect. His principal innovation is the “one in, two out rule,” which requires agencies to
eliminate two regulations for every new one. See Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg.
9339, 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017). That requirement, which is supplemental to existing ones, raises
issues not relevant here.
39
See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015), and in particular: “The Agency must
consider cost—including, most importantly, cost of compliance—before deciding whether
regulation is appropriate and necessary. . . . [R]easonable regulation ordinarily requires
paying attention to the advantages and the disadvantages of agency decisions.” Id. at 2707,
2711.
40
See id. at 2711, and these words from the dissent: “Cost is almost always a relevant—
and usually, a highly important—factor in regulation. Unless Congress provides otherwise,
an agency acts unreasonably in establishing ‘a standard-setting process that ignore[s]
economic considerations.’” Id. at 2716–17 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Indus. Union
Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 670 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment)). (We note that the textual reference to the views of eight of the
nine current Justices merely reflects the fact that Justice Gorsuch was not on the Court
during the year of the decision.)
41
See id. at 2707 (majority opinion) (“Read naturally in the present context, the phrase
‘appropriate and necessary’ requires at least some attention to cost. One would not say that it
is even rational, never mind ‘appropriate,’ to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in
return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits.”). For general discussion, see
Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1
(2017) [hereinafter Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review].
42
See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 27; Amy Sinden et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis:
New Foundations on Shifting Sand, 3 Reg. & Governance 48 (2009) (reviewing Adler &
Posner, supra note 31).
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consequences matter, and cost-benefit analysis is a way of cataloguing
them.43 Put less simply, the idea is that as a presumption, congressional
grants of regulatory authority should be taken as an effort to increase
people’s welfare or well-being.44 (We use the terms interchangeably.)
While different agencies are given different missions, which allow them
to develop and exploit their expertise, they should be taken to share this
abstract commitment to human welfare.45
A regulation typically has both positive and negative effects on
welfare. It might save costs and improve health, safety, or some other
component of well-being, but also create welfare losses, perhaps to
health, safety, or some other component of well-being as well.46 For
example, a regulation that increases fuel economy, and thus improves
health by reducing air pollution, might produce less safe cars.47 A
regulation that protects the ozone layer, by forbidding use of ozonedepleting chemicals, might require a ban on the use of cheap and

43
For a valuable discussion of this claim, see Howard Margolis, Dealing with Risk: Why
the Public and the Experts Disagree on Environmental Issues 75–79 (1996).
44
We are bracketing issues about the relationships among cost-benefit balancing and
welfarism, and about the precise role of distributional considerations. For discussion, see
Adler, supra note 31, at 32–37. It is possible to believe, for example, that the well-being of
those at the bottom deserve priority, and also to insist that in some cases, the outcome of
cost-benefit analysis does not track the outcome of welfarist analysis. These are important
issues but beyond the scope of the present discussion, the goal of which is to sketch the
argument for consideration of costs and benefits. One can accept that argument while also
insisting on relevant qualifications, including an emphasis on the well-being of those at the
bottom. On welfarist grounds, consideration of moral commitments is well justified, for
reasons that we will sketch. Whether consideration of such commitments is desirable on
distributional grounds depends on the content of those commitments.
45
With this claim, we do not mean to disregard the suggestion that regulatory statutes are
frequently enacted with the goal of helping well-organized private groups. For classic
discussions, see George J. Stigler, The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation 114–44
(1975). Cost-benefit analysis can be seen as an effort to impose a welfarist check on this
possibility, requiring congressional clarity. For a philosophical discussion of the meaning of
welfare or well-being, see James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral
Importance (1986).
46
See John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in Risk
Versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment 1 (John D. Graham &
Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1997).
47
This is a disputed question. For one view, see Mark R. Jacobsen, Fuel Economy, Car
Class Mix, and Safety, 101 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 105 (2011).
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effective asthma inhalers.48 A regulation that requires factories to install
scrubbers in smokestacks benefits people by reducing the level of
pollution in the air, but also creates costs for the factory owners, who
must pay for the installation of the scrubbers.49 These costs may well be
passed along to workers, in the form of lower wages; to consumers, in
the form of higher prices; and to shareholders, in the form of lower
returns. If so, all of these people lose money that they could otherwise
use to buy things of importance to them. Since the ultimate goal of
regulation is to advance well-being, these negative effects should be
considered along with the positive effects.
Even without using cost-benefit analysis, regulators have long been
aware that they must engage in some sort of balancing. For example, an
environmental regulation of maximal stringency could require the
shutdown of factories and cause massive unemployment, which no one
wants, and which can cause adverse health effects. For the years before
the Reagan executive order, many agencies seem to have engaged in a
kind of intuitive balancing, in which they chose regulations that
produced benefits but were not unduly disruptive to important social
interests.50 It was not always clear how they engaged in this balancing. A
signal virtue of cost-benefit analysis is that intuitive guesswork is
replaced with a more rigorous style of reasoning, one that provides for
far greater transparency about crucial variables and that should reduce
the scope for error, at least if it is working well.51

48

Food & Drug Admin., Users of Last CFC Inhalers Must Soon Switch (May 28, 2013),
http://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/20170722060725/https://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/
ConsumerUpdates/ucm353701.htm [https://perma.cc/N6VN-9AVB].
49
For a classic discussion, see Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean
Coal/Dirty Air: Or How the Clean Air Act Became a Multibillion-Dollar Bail-Out for HighSulfur Coal Producers and What Should Be Done About It (1981).
50
We simplify. For details, see W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private
Responsibilities for Risk 255–56 (1992).
51
For a vivid argument to this effect, see Dietrich Dörner, The Logic of Failure: Why
Things Go Wrong and What We Can Do to Make Them Right (Rita Kimber & Robert
Kimber trans., 1996) (exploring, in experimental settings, how most people fail to see the
full range of consequences of policy choices). We acknowledge that there are alternatives to
cost-benefit analysis. For example, some people favor the precautionary principle. See
Daniel Steel, Philosophy and the Precautionary Principle: Science, Evidence, and
Environmental Policy (2015).
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B. The Occasionally Acute Challenge of Monetization
The key requirement of cost-benefit analysis is that the positive and
negative effects of the regulation must be translated into the common
metric of money (to the extent feasible). In the case of some benefits and
some costs, the exercise is straightforward because no translation is
necessary. When a factory is required to install pollution-control
technology, the cost is simply the amount of money needed to pay for
the machinery and for the labor to install it. Because this cost is
ultimately borne by consumers, workers, and shareholders, it reduces
human welfare.52
But monetizing some impacts (whether costs or benefits) can be far
more complex.53 Consider a regulation that enhances water quality in a
national park by reducing industrial runoffs. Beneficiaries will include
people who save the costs of traveling to a more distant national park or
using private recreational facilities, such as an indoor waterpark. These
costs can be easily put in monetary terms. But both costs and benefits
may be nonpecuniary. Regulations can reduce mortality risk, minimize
unpleasant but not dangerous health conditions like headaches, and
enhance the beauty of the outdoors.
Regulators may describe some of these benefits as nonquantifiable.54
But they often attempt to convert them into monetary terms for use in
cost-benefit analysis, and when they do so, they use a range of methods.
Whatever the precise choice, they tend to begin by asking about people’s
willingness to pay.55 In principle, they agree that the right question is
how much people are willing to pay to eliminate (for example) a
mortality risk of 1/100,000 or a morbidity risk of 1/10,000. Typically,
they derive estimates from market behavior—for example, calculating
the value of reduced mortality risk by deriving risk premiums from labor
52

Even in this simple example, some costs may not be easy to monetize—as, for example,
if the regulation produces unemployment.
53
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 1369
(2014) [hereinafter Sunstein, Limits of Quantification] (analyzing the challenges faced by
agencies when undertaking cost-benefit analysis for some variables that cannot be
quantified).
54
See id. at 1395–96.
55
See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular A-4, To the Heads of Executive Agencies and
Establishments: Regulatory Analysis 18 (2003), https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_
a004_a-4 [https://perma.cc/T4KG-KH7P].
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market choices.56 More controversially, they sometimes use contingent
valuation surveys, where people are simply asked to give monetary
equivalents to nonpecuniary benefits.57
With these various methods, the central idea is that, if people face
risks of one or another kind, or if they might obtain gains, the correct
approach is to ask: how much is the relevant good actually worth to
them? That approach has a natural fit with welfarism and in particular
with that strand of the liberal political tradition, associated with John
Stuart Mill, that relies on people’s own judgments about what serves
their interests.58 For example, risk reduction can be seen as a good like
other goods, such as education, medical care, clothing, and food. For
such goods, we often rely on markets, which allow people to buy those
goods that they want. If what matters is people’s welfare, and if they
have a good sense of what will promote their welfare, it makes sense to
rely on their willingness to pay, at least as a presumption.59
The willingness-to-pay approach can also draw support from a
competing strand of the same tradition, emphasizing autonomy rather
than welfare.60 By asking how much people are willing to pay,
regulators are respecting people’s right to trade off relevant goods as
they see fit. To be sure, the willingness-to-pay criterion raises many
questions and doubts,61 and we will have something to say about them
here. For present purposes, the point is only that the use of that criterion
is an intelligible way to ensure that regulators use people’s own
valuations of multiple goods, including improved health and safety.

56

See Viscusi, supra note 50, at 34–41.
See Richard T. Carson, Contingent Valuation: A Practical Alternative when Prices
Aren’t Available, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 2012, at 27, 28.
58
See Mill, supra note 28.
59
For a vivid demonstration, see generally Dennis C. Cory & Lester D. Taylor, On the
Distributional Implications of Safe Drinking Water Standards, 8 J. Benefit-Cost Analysis 49
(2017) (finding that for poor people, safe drinking water standards may produce costs in
excess of benefits).
60
See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 449
(2000).
61
An obvious one is whether people’s willingness to pay reflects sufficient information or
is subject to behavioral biases. For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit
Revolution (forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Revolution].
57
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C. Three Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cost-benefit analysis has value only to the extent that it advances a
normatively defensible goal. That goal, as we have explained, is human
welfare. Cost-benefit analysis is not justified if it fails to advance
welfare, and even if it does so, it might be criticized if it interferes with
important nonwelfarist goals (assuming, as many people believe, that
there are some). Consider three limits of cost-benefit balancing.
First, net benefits or net costs, as reflected in purely monetary
measures based on willingness to pay, may greatly understate or
overstate the actual effects of regulation on people’s lives, because
people’s willingness-to-pay judgments may be a product of inadequate
information or behavioral biases.62 People might be willing to pay little
for goods that would much improve their lives; they might be willing a
pay a lot for goods that would not much improve their lives. The
mounting interest in more direct measurement of subjective well-being63
has not yet produced an administrable way of capturing the actual
effects of regulatory interventions.64 But it has pointed to the possibility
that cost-benefit analysis may not capture those effects accurately, or as
accurately as other methods would.
Second, some consequences of regulations are difficult to translate
into monetary equivalents. One reason may be an absence of adequate
information about their actual effects, even before regulators begin to
think about how to quantify them. Another reason is that the challenge
of monetization may be hard to surmount even if regulators are able to
obtain that information.65 What, exactly, would be the effects of a new
security measure (such as a laptop ban or enhanced screening
procedures) designed to reduce the risks of terrorism at airports? If we
know those effects, how can they be monetized? What, exactly, are the
benefits of increased capital and liquidity requirements, designed to
reduce the risk of a financial crisis? Can those effects be turned into
62

John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 Duke L.J.
1603, 1619–20 (2013).
63
See, e.g., id. at 1619–20.
64
W. Kip Viscusi, The Benefits of Mortality Risk Reduction: Happiness Surveys vs. The
Value of a Statistical Life, 62 Duke L.J. 1735, 1738–39, 1745 (2013).
65
See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case
Studies and Implications, 124 Yale L.J. 882, 893–95 (2015).
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monetary equivalents? How many lives will be saved by technology
designed to reduce the risk of backover crashes? If regulators can obtain
that information, how can they monetize those savings, if the plurality of
the lives saved consists of children under the age of four, and if what is
being prevented is death at the hands of their own parents?66
A third challenge, and a source of intense debate, is the diminishing
marginal utility of money. Because wealthy people value dollars less
than poor people do, wealthy people are willing to pay more money for
an outcome—say, clean air or the reduction of mortality risk—that
affects the welfare of rich and poor people the same. To say the least, it
seems objectionable to say that regulation should treat a mortality risk as
if it were more important for rich people than for poor people. In
principle, however, that may not be a serious objection to the use of the
willingness-to-pay criterion. Poor people do not spend as much on safety
devices as rich people do. That is not because the lives of the poor are
worth less but because the poor have less money and prefer to spend it
on other things, like school supplies for their children. This is how a
market economy works, and in the absence of special circumstances
(such as an absence of information or a behavioral bias), regulators do
poor people no favors by forcing them to use their resources on
something for which they are unwilling to pay.
It follows that, if agencies issue regulations that force poor people to
pay more for safety than they are willing to pay, those regulations may
well hurt rather than help poor people. People with little money should
not be required to spend as much to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000 as
people with a great deal of money. But it is true that when a regulatory
good is shared, assessment of welfare effects can be quite complicated.67
Regulators now use a single number to value mortality risks—about $9

66

For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1607, 1640 (2016).
67
If a rich person’s willingness to pay is used to determine a public good like air quality,
then the effect is to redistribute wealth from the poor (in the form of higher prices) to the rich
(in the form of air quality that is higher than what poor people desire). If the poor person’s
willingness to pay is used, then the effect is to redistribute wealth from the rich (who die at a
higher rate than otherwise) to the poor (who pay lower prices).
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million per statistical life68—and hence disparities between rich and poor
are not a matter of current practice.69
D. Willingness to Pay for Moral Reasons
Many regulations are animated by moral concerns that go far beyond
their effects on those who choose the relevant products. For example, a
regulation might be designed to protect people who do not live in the
United States; consider an effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
motivated in part by a concern for people in other countries. Indeed, the
principal purpose of some regulations is to protect something other than
human beings. Return to the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information
Act, which imposed labeling requirements to inform consumers if tuna
used in tuna products was caught using drift nets and other methods that
harm dolphins.70 The statute evidently was passed in response to
concerns that tuna harvesting caused excessive harm to dolphin wellbeing, not to human well-being.
To understand the category that concerns us here, compare Jane and
Sam. Jane suffers from seafood intolerances, as a result of which she
greatly benefits when food products include labels that disclose whether
trace amounts of seafood are present in the product. Before the Food
Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act71 was enacted, she
bought organic foods from specialty stores that cost about $1,000 per
year more than comparable food products sold in supermarkets. As a
result of the law, Jane can now shop at supermarkets; she is at least
$1,000 better off per year and can use this money to buy goods and
services that she could not afford in the past. As long as she uses this
money for saving and consumption, the $1,000 amount is a reasonable
approximation of the impact of the law on her well-being; it might well
be a lower bound.
68

See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Revised Departmental Guidance 2016: Treatment of the
Value of Preventing Fatalities and Injuries in Preparing Economic Analyses 1,
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/2016%20Revised%20Value%20of%
20a%20Statistical%20Life%20Guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8ZD-VWNF].
69
We are simply sketching some of the complexities here. For detailed discussion, see
Matthew D. Adler, The Ethical Value of Risk Reduction: Utilitarianism, Prioritarianism and
Cost-Benefit Analysis, in Ethics and Risk Management 9 (Lina Svedin ed., 2015).
70
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
71
21 U.S.C. § 343(w) (2012).
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Sam does not suffer from food intolerances, but he cares deeply about
the well-being of dolphins. He donates $1,000 per year to a charity that
lobbies for laws that protect dolphin populations from harm by drift nets
used to catch tuna. When Congress enacts the Dolphin Protection
Consumer Information Act, Sam is very happy. But he is not sure
whether the law should affect his charitable giving. He still cares about
dolphins, and he thinks that the $1,000 might be used to lobby for a
stricter law that bans drift nets or for some other law that will help
dolphins. But he also needs to pay his mortgage.
The Allergen Labeling Act improves Jane’s well-being in a
straightforward way. But does the Dolphin Act improve Sam’s wellbeing? A tempting position is that, while the law helps advance one of
Sam’s moral commitments, it does not affect his well-being. It does not
improve his health or safety, give him goods or services to consume, or
(directly) enhance his wealth (we will return to the issue of the
charitable donation). Another way to make this point is to imagine a
world in which people like Sam disappear. No one cares about dolphins
anymore. Nonetheless, a respectable view in moral philosophy is that it
remains wrong to kill dolphins unnecessarily with drift nets. A utilitarian
will probably believe that the well-being of animals has independent
…
moral importance.72 That was Bentham’s view, in fact,73 and we share it.
But some philosophers who do not embrace utilitarianism believe that an
objective moral reality exists and does not depend on what people’s
moral beliefs are at any given moment.74 They believe, for example, that
slavery is morally wrong even if no one in society, not even the slaves
themselves, believes that it is morally wrong.75 On this view, the moral
worth of dolphins does not depend on whether Sam exists, or whether
many or few people agree with Sam.

72

See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation 5–7 (1975).
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 282–83
(J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996).
74
Alexander Miller, Realism, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N.
Zalta et al. eds., Winter 2016 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/
realism/.
75
Cf. Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality 109–40 (1993)
(discussing “adaptive preferences” and their challenge for utilitarianism).
73
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This view seems to have a surprising implication. If, as we have
argued, cost-benefit analysis is a welfarist decision procedure, then it
might be thought that, insofar as regulators are engaging in that form of
analysis, they will take into account Jane’s self-regarding preferences
and disregard Sam’s moral beliefs. To understand this argument (which
we shall shortly reject), consider the Benthamite view. If 100,000
dolphins exist, then their continued existence has moral value reflecting
the well-being of those dolphins. If we take Sam’s $1,000 charitable
donation as an approximation of his willingness to pay to keep the
dolphins alive, this would imply that the moral value of the existence of
the dolphins is $1,000. If 1,000 people agree with Sam, their moral value
equals $1 million. And if the Sams disappeared, the moral value of
dolphins in a cost-benefit analysis would fall to $0. But as we have
explained, the moral value of the dolphins is not a function of the
number of people who care about dolphins. This means that the costbenefit analysis should not treat Sam’s willingness to pay as a reflection
of their moral value.
On this view, a regulatory agency charged with implementing the
Dolphin Act should conduct cost-benefit analyses, but insofar as it is
doing so, it should ignore moral valuations, including those that are
expressed in charitable donations. To be sure, moral arguments, captured
in the commitment to the well-being of dolphins, matter and deserve
independent consideration; under the relevant law, they might
complement or override cost-benefit analysis. With respect to that form
of analysis, however, Sam’s moral views are irrelevant.
Our principal submission here is that this conclusion is not correct.
The first and more minor point is that, when Sam donates $1,000 to the
dolphin charity, he has $1,000 less to spend on his own well-being. If we
want to be precise, we need to analyze carefully Sam’s motivations. If
the regulation causes Sam to spend the entire amount on himself, then
the regulation does make him better off by $1,000. If a regulation that
helps dolphins causes Sam to reconsider his moral priorities and donate
the money elsewhere, then it is harder to know whether and to what
extent it improves Sam’s well-being.
But there is a far more fundamental point, which bears directly on that
question. Suppose that Sam’s welfare is affected by what happens to
dolphins. When he hears about them being caught in drift nets, he
experiences a loss of welfare, probably captured in a pang of
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unhappiness. This sense of empathy is a psychological reaction, in some
ways akin to disgust, anger, and fear, and it is highly relevant to Sam’s
welfare. Certainly in principle, the cost-benefit analysis should take
account of the positive psychological effect on people of protecting
those about whom they care. People are willing to pay to improve their
welfare, and affective states are an important component of welfare. (If,
by contrast, Sam is willing to pay something to protect dolphins but does
not suffer when dolphins are not harmed, our argument does not apply.
An affect-free agent, incapable of suffering but seeking to increase
social welfare, would be willing to pay to protect dolphins, but by
hypothesis, would not lose welfare if dolphins are harmed.)
It follows that, if the entire dolphin population were eliminated, or if a
significant number of dolphins were killed, then there would be two
separate effects: a moral effect and a welfare effect. (To be sure, the
moral effect is a kind of welfare effect, but it does not involve
consumers or even human beings.76) Both effects should count. If you
are a moral realist, a moral wrong has taken place, and it is independent
of the welfare effects on humans. The elimination of dolphins also
harms human welfare by causing unhappiness or other welfare loss
among people who care about dolphins. This harm can be measured, at
least in principle, and is, of course, a function of the size of the human
population that cares about dolphins.
Here, in short, is our central claim: when regulators conduct costbenefit analysis, they should include valuations that reflect the welfare
loss that people experience if their moral commitments are not
vindicated. Willingness to pay is the best measure of that loss. The
resulting figures will not capture everything that matters, but they are an
important point of a full accounting.

76
To be clear, the “welfare effect” is also a kind of moral effect since welfare (on most
views) is morally important. Another way to make the distinction in the text is that what we
call the “moral effect” refers to the morally relevant consequences of a regulation other than
the effect of those consequences on the psychological or mental well-being of affected
observers, including both negative effect and more abstract willingness to pay to vindicate a
moral commitment. The psychological consequences are what we mean by the “welfare
effect.”
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E. Limiting Principles
We intend our claim to be a concrete and relatively straightforward
suggestion for how to conduct cost-benefit analysis. But we
acknowledge that our argument bears on some of the most fundamental
questions in legal and political theory, and taken for all that it is worth, it
might seem unacceptably broad. To see the concern, suppose that











some people think that pornography is morally unacceptable
and are willing to pay something to ban it;
some people object to affirmative action on moral grounds
and are willing to pay something to ban it;
some people favor increases in the minimum wage on moral
grounds and are willing to pay something for such increases;
some people think that same-sex marriage is morally
unacceptable and are willing to pay something to ban it;
some people think that hate speech (as they define it) is
morally unacceptable and are willing to pay something to ban
it;
some people have strong moral objections to the use of
contraceptives and are willing to pay to see them banned;
the very idea of alcohol consumption is, to many people,
morally problematic, and they would gladly pay to reduce it;
certain religious practices seem morally offensive to people
who would be willing to pay to stamp them out;
some people object on moral grounds to opening stores on
Sunday and would happily pay something for Sunday closing
laws;
some people greatly dislike the very idea of transgender
people, on moral grounds, and would pay something to ensure
that they use the bathroom available to people of their
biological sex.

These examples could easily be proliferated.77 Under a standard view
of liberalism, the government is allowed to intervene where there is

77

It should be clear that in all of these cases, we are assuming that people would
experience a welfare loss if their moral commitment is violated.
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harm to others78 and to correct a variety of market failures.79 But liberal
constraints on government would dissipate if officials could take
account of preferences about other people’s behavior in order to decide
whether or how to regulate—for example, by banning otherwise purely
private conduct (reading controversial literature, practicing certain
religions, listening to certain music) on the ground that its very
occurrence creates distress. Some of the cases we have given involve
preferences about what is otherwise purely private conduct. Whether or
not any particular form of liberalism is correct, it seems critical to
identify limiting principles.
Indeed, some people might be tempted to suggest that, if identifying
such principles proves difficult, there should be a general prohibition on
including moral commitments in cost-benefit analysis at all. That
conclusion might be defended on the ground that, while such a
prohibition leads to a problem of underinclusiveness (in welfarist terms),
it reduces unacceptable decisional complexity and avoids a problem of
overinclusiveness (in welfarist or other terms). In theory, consideration
of (some) moral commitments is indeed required on welfarist grounds.
But in practice, the argument might go, consideration of (any) such
commitments might impose costs in excess of benefits.
As an analogy, and in some ways an overlapping argument, consider
Judge Guido Calabresi’s claim that economic analysis of law should
take into account people’s moral opposition to trading certain goods
(such as organs) on the market.80 Calabresi is bracketing the question
whether that moral opposition is justified. In an argument akin to our
own, he is arguing that people suffer a welfare loss when some such
trading occurs, and he thinks that on welfare grounds, economists have
no good reason not to take that welfare loss into account.81

78

See Mill, supra note 28, at 21–27; see also Raz, supra note 29, at 400–01, 412–20
(describing Mill’s harm principle).
79
See generally Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 15–35 (1982).
80
See Guido Calabresi, The Future of Law and Economics: Essays in Reform and
Recollection 43–48, 145–47 (2016).
81
Id. at 145–46. This is not the place for a discussion of Calabresi’s intriguing suggestion,
but as he is aware, consideration of the welfare losses that come from moral opposition to
trades raises complex and fundamental issues. See Sen, supra note 28. Our own focus is on
the practice of regulatory agencies, and on more standard questions that they encounter, but
Calabresi’s argument raises the possibility that whenever the law does not block a trade or
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We cannot rule that position off-limits, but for purposes of our
recommendation here, limiting principles can be identified. Let us begin
with legal constraints. The most obvious come from the Constitution. If,
for example, people like the idea of racial segregation or think that sex
discrimination is wonderful, their willingness to pay for regulations that
promote racial segregation or sex discrimination cannot be counted. It is
true that a strict welfarist, armed with a perfect method for calculating
welfare effects, might want to consider all such effects,82 but it is safe to
suggest that regulatory welfarism, implemented through cost-benefit
analysis, may not take account of moral commitments that offend the
Constitution.
So too, some moral commitments are inconsistent with statutory
requirements. Some people might believe that civil rights laws are
inconsistent with what morality requires because they intrude on
freedom of association, or insist that minimum wage and maximum hour
laws have the same defect. Committed libertarians would object to many
regulations on this general ground; perhaps they suffer a welfare loss if
their moral objections are not respected.83 Should their moral opposition
count in cost-benefit analysis, to the extent that it is backed by
willingness to pay, reflective of a welfare loss? Here again, a strict
welfarist would be open to the possibility that preferences of this kind
must be counted in a cost-benefit analysis. But for purposes of actual
practice, regulators can certainly refuse to take account of moral
commitments that are inconsistent with existing sources of law.84
does block a trade, cost-benefit analysis should consider whether people oppose what the law
does on moral grounds and take any resulting welfare losses into account.
Put the evident practical and administrative issues to one side (acknowledging that those
issues may be decisive). In principle, we are not at all sure that Calabresi’s argument is
correct, for his argument—suggesting that trades might be blocked because people oppose
them on moral grounds and would suffer welfare losses from their occurrence—would
threaten to undo freedom of contract in many settings. But we recognize that investigation of
this issue, from a welfarist perspective, would require extended discussion.
82
We do not take a stand on that controversial question here.
83
For a view in this general direction, see Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex
World (1995).
84
There is an important complexity here, which is that under prevailing executive orders,
agencies must catalogue all costs and benefits, even if they are not, under the relevant source
of law, pertinent to the agency’s decision as to whether and how to proceed. See supra notes
32–38 and accompanying text. For example, agencies must catalogue costs even when the
statute requires cost-blindness. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 109(b), (d), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b),
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A different argument is that regulators should advance democratic
values rather than welfare. If so, then the problem of limiting principles
is resolved: democratic values provide those principles.85 The moral
preferences we have discussed are frequently embodied in statutes. On
one view, regulators honor both those moral preferences and democratic
values by using the statutes as their guides, even when statutes do not
strictly compel a particular regulatory outcome. If statutes provide the
relevant values, then we need not bother with consideration of
willingness to pay to protect moral commitments.
Suppose, for example, that the Clean Air Act displays a moral
commitment to environmental values that is stronger than the values that
are inferred from market behavior and contingent valuations surveys that
occur today. The difference could result from any number of factors: a
change in public attitudes toward the environment over a half century;
advantages that the democratic process gives to some people, and hence
their moral opinions, over others; or the unreliability of inferring
valuations from market data and surveys.86 Whatever the reason,
regulators should look at statutes, not at willingness to pay.

(d) (2012) (directing the Administrator to prescribe air quality standards that “allow[] an
adequate margin of safety” and are “requisite to protect the public health”); see also Am.
Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1040–41 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding that § 109 of the
Clean Air Act prohibits the EPA from considering costs when setting and revising air quality
standards). That requirement is controversial. Within the executive branch, high-level
officials have sometimes argued that cost-benefit analysis should be limited to statutorily
relevant factors. (Sunstein can report that this argument was made during the Obama
administration.) The prevailing argument, which we embrace, is that public accountability is
promoted if agencies catalogue, and reveal to the public (including the President and
Congress), the full range of costs and benefits, even if they are not entitled to take some of
them into account.
It might therefore be asked: shouldn’t agencies be required to catalogue costs or benefits
associated with the realization or frustration of moral commitments, even if they are not
statutorily relevant, and indeed even if the Constitution rules them out of bounds? We cannot
rule out a “yes” answer, but in many cases, cataloguing the lawfully irrelevant costs and
benefits, stemming from violations of moral commitments, would be both difficult and silly,
which is a pretty bad combination.
85
We are grateful to John Coates for pressing this objection.
86
As we note in Section II.F below, the complexity of the moral environment, in which
many seemingly incommensurable objects of moral concern compete for limited resources,
might cause people to delegate to their political representatives the task of setting moral
priorities for the use of public funds. Thus, it is possible that democratic outcomes might
provide a more reliable indication of people’s moral views than their own behavior does.
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The potential disparity between statutory enactments and willingnessto-pay measures raise questions that are beyond the scope of the current
discussion. Fortunately, it is irrelevant to our recommendation. Recall
that we are speaking of cases in which statutes do not dictate any
particular result. If they do not, then it is pointless to speak of honoring
democratic values, which are too abstract to settle the question of
appropriate stringency. Except when statutes bar or mandate a particular
regulatory outcome, they do not provide enough detail to allow a
regulator to infer valuations for particular outcomes not covered by the
statute, which is exactly why regulators exercise discretion.
Our focus is on cases where statutes do grant discretion, and in those
cases, democratic values fail to specify how agency should exercise that
discretion.87 Admittedly, some statutes may require outcomes that
cannot be justified on welfarist grounds, perhaps because of the power
of self-interested private groups, perhaps because of deontological
judgments, or perhaps because of Congress’s failure to assemble the
necessary information.
We have noted that a significant strand in liberal political theory
suggests that the government may not interfere with people’s freedom of
action unless there is “harm to others.”88 Taken for all that it is worth,
our argument is inconsistent with that view, for it suggests that if
freedom of action offends people’s moral sensibilities, it might be
appropriately regulated, if those who are offended are willing to pay for
the interference.
Importantly, the particular cases that concern us here are in no tension
with the liberal position because harm to others is involved.
Nonetheless, our argument could easily be taken to cut more broadly.
For reasons that have produced an extensive debate in economics and
political philosophy, a welfarist would indeed have some trouble with
the liberal position—as, for example, when people are willing to pay to
produce illiberal results (such as bans on racial intermarriage or
offensive speech).89 But for those who broadly embrace the liberal
position, it would be possible to accept our argument while insisting on
87

Recall that even if they do so, agencies are ordinarily required to catalogue all costs and
benefits, even those that are statutorily irrelevant.
88
See Mill, supra note 28, at 22; accord Raz, supra note 29, at 400–01.
89
See Sen, supra note 28.
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limiting its domain to cases in which harm to others is involved. We
emphasize that the cases that we explore here do involve that harm and
hence fit comfortably within liberal constraints.
There is an additional point. It is not fanciful to suppose that some
people rejoice, and others feel dismay, at the very issuance of
regulations, perhaps because of their attitudes toward regulation as such,
perhaps because of the general area in which particular regulations fall.
Should regulators survey the American people to see whether rejoicing
or dismay would accompany the issuance of their regulations and try to
elicit the corresponding willingness to pay?
Here again, a strict welfarist might be tempted to answer “yes.” But
that answer seems daft. To say the least, it is hard to generate numbers
that are reliable in this context. In any case, it would be most surprising
if the welfare effects from abstract reactions of this kind turned out to
have the same magnitude as the effects from the more concrete
commitments that concern us here. (Do people really get a lot of welfare
on days when the Federal Register is especially long, or especially
short? Apart from the more material effects of specific regulations?)
Moreover, it is possible that at this level of abstraction, valuations in
different directions will cancel each other out. People who are
philosophically opposed to economic regulation in general might be
willing to pay a small amount to block any type of regulation, but then
there are people who welcome government oversight, and they are likely
to be willing to pay a small amount for further government involvement
in economic life.
More broadly, some utilitarians have said that some preferences,
including sadistic or malicious preferences, should not count in the
utilitarian (or welfarist) calculus.90 To be sure, it is reasonable to wonder
whether any such conclusion is ultimately justified on utilitarian (or
welfarist) grounds, or whether it requires some kind of nonutilitarian (or
nonwelfarist) explanation. We do not need to answer that question in
order to acknowledge that private willingness to pay for certain
outcomes (involving, say, acute human suffering) ought not to be
counted, even if those outcomes would please people.91
90

See Richard B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right 208–23 (1998).
Consider Dworkin’s broader view, suggesting a general ban on the use of what he calls
“external preferences”:
91
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F. Two Implementation Questions
Subject to the foregoing limitations, what are the practical
implications of our general conclusion for cost-benefit analysis?
1. What Congress wants. The first question is simple: if Congress
asks agencies to protect dolphins because it believes that dolphins have
independent moral value, shouldn’t agencies obey Congress’s
instructions? Of course they should. And if Congress wants agencies to
disregard cost-benefit analysis in protecting dolphins, then they should
do that as well.92 As we shall see, sometimes Congress simply requires
agencies to act, and the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis (whether it is
unfavorable to action or leaves unanswered questions) cannot justify
inaction.
At the same time, prevailing executive orders require an accounting
of both costs and benefits, and ignoring a class of benefits will ensure
that the accounting is inaccurate. It is also clear that in many cases of
importance, Congress does not want agencies to disregard cost-benefit
analysis, and agencies should not do so. The reason is rooted in the
nature of regulation. Sometimes agencies are given discretion to
regulate, and cost-benefit analysis helps inform them whether they ought
to do so. As we have noted, the issue is often not whether to regulate,
but how strictly to regulate. An analysis of costs and benefits is almost
always relevant to that issue. If, for example, numerous dolphins would
be protected by an expensive regulation, the argument for that regulation
Suppose many citizens, who themselves do not swim, prefer [that their city build a
pool rather than a theater] because they approve of sports and admire athletes . . . . If
the altruistic preferences are counted, so as to reinforce the personal preferences of
swimmers, the result will be a form of double counting: each swimmer will have the
benefit not only of his own preference, but also of the preference of someone else who
takes pleasure in his success.
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 235 (1978). This view raises many questions. For
one thing, it is not clear that there is double-counting at all; independent preferences seem to
be involved. We bracket those difficulties here and note simply that the class of preferences
with which we are concerned do not raise the potential problem of double-counting and that
they must be included on welfarist grounds. If, for example, American consumers are
concerned with suffering in Rwanda, there is no double-counting when those concerns are
registered.
92
See generally Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 465–71 (2001) (finding
that statutory language requiring the EPA to set standards for certain pollutants at a level
“requisite to protect the public health” with “an adequate margin of safety” prohibits cost
considerations in determining those standards).
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is stronger than if it would protect few dolphins. And if people’s
willingness to pay to protect dolphins is very high, the argument for that
regulation receives additional fortification.
2. A daunting task. The second question concerns how agencies
should use moral valuations in cost-benefit analysis. Should an agency
really try to figure out private willingness to pay? We have said that in
principle, the answer is yes. But we acknowledge that the task can be
daunting. It is impossible to rule out the possibility that in some cases,
reliable quantification is not possible, and the most that the agency can
do is to point to the existence of a positive amount without specifying
it.93 One reason involves the potential unreliability of the only available
tools.
Suppose, for example, that the question is how much Americans
would pay to reduce some harm done to fish in the Atlantic Ocean. It is
easy to imagine a contingent valuation study that would produce some
number for the average American—say, $5 annually, which would yield
an annual benefit figure in excess of $1 billion. The problem is that, for
countless regulations that produce moral benefits, it would likely be easy
to produce the same number, which might suggest that the average
American would be willing to have a “moral budget” of say $5,000 or
more (if there are 1,000 or more such regulations), and that might seem
to defy belief. People might be willing to pay a nontrivial amount to help
solve one problem, but if they were given a full universe of problems,
the amount that they would be willing to pay to help solve any particular
one might get close to $0. The problem, in short, is that contingent
valuation studies often ask for willingness to pay about particular
problems in isolation rather than requiring respondents to consider how
payments to solve one problem would reduce funds available to solve
numerous others. As a result, the method may produce unreliable
…
answers.94 Perhaps appropriate studies can overcome this problem95—
but perhaps not.96
93

There is precedent here. In the context of backover crashes, the agency referred to
parents’ concerns for their children, and deemed them relevant, but did not monetize them.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
94
Hausman, supra note 20, at 47–49.
95
Carson, supra note 57, at 30–31, 34–35.
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For the kinds of preferences and values that concern us here, it might
be tempting to ask instead about charitable contributions, which reflect
actual behavior. Such contributions give real evidence about how much
people are willing to pay on behalf of their moral commitments. It is
noteworthy, and perhaps revealing, that people give very little relative to
the universe of moral actions that the government may take. In the
United States, charitable donations amount to about 2% of GDP every
year.97 That might seem like a large number, but for any particular object
of charity, it suggests that the relevant value would be low. An
implication is that, if agencies either relied on charitable donations in
order to estimate valuations, or instead disregarded them, their ultimate
choices would usually not be much affected.
Another way to think about this problem is to consider that the
median household has an income of about $56,00098 and that the median
donation to charity is about $2,520.99 If the donation plus taxes reflect
the household’s moral view of how much it owes to moral projects, then
it might well object to further contributions to moral outcomes that take
place through regulations that increase the cost of consumer goods. It
might even reduce donations to offset the loss from higher prices.100
We do not want to reach strong conclusions from these numbers and
possibilities. It remains true that for various reasons, charitable
contributions might understate people’s willingness to pay. For example,
people might not give much to organizations that seek to reduce use of
96
Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better
than No Number?, 8 J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1994, at 45, 46.
97
Giving USA, Highlights: An Overview of Giving in 2015, at 2 (2016), https://store.
givingusa.org/a/downloads/-/f1dc25f71867a8bd/5f87ab26f8321422 [https://perma.cc/5GBQ
-N58Z]; see also Nat’l Philanthropic Tr., Charitable Giving Statistics, https://www.nptrust.
org/philanthropic-resources/charitable-giving-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/4QGU-C4EG] (last
visited Mar. 4, 2017) (describing charitable giving during 2016).
98
As of 2015. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Real Median Household Income in the
United States (Aug. 23, 2017), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEHOINUSA672N
[https://perma.cc/SH8Q-6SAR].
99
See Nat’l Philanthropic Tr., supra note 97 (citing U.S. Tr. & Ind. Univ. Lilly Family
Sch. of Philanthropy, The 2016 U.S. Trust Study of High Net Worth Philanthropy:
Charitable Practices and Preferences of Wealthy Households 15 (Oct. 2016),
http://www.ustrust.com/publish/content/application/pdf/GWMOL/USTp_ARMCGDN7_oct
_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/79BS-BCU3]).
100
See James Andreoni, Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and
Ricardian Equivalence, 97 J. Pol. Econ. 1447, 1449, 1457 (1989).
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GM food, but they might nonetheless be willing to pay something for
GM labels. The example suggests that willingness to pay, properly
assessed, might greatly exceed charitable contributions. People might
not trust that charitable contributions will actually go to their preferred
causes; inertia matters, and may have a large deterrent effect on
contributions; apart from inertia, making such contributions requires
people to incur transactions costs; and in the case of public goods,
people might be willing to contribute if and only if they are assured that
significant numbers of other people are contributing as well.101
Our major goal is to acknowledge rather than to resolve the
measurement problem and to insist on the basic principle: people
experience welfare losses from social outcomes that offend their moral
commitments, even if those outcomes do not involve their own wealth or
health. Private willingness to pay is the best way to measure those
losses. Eliciting the relevant values can be extremely challenging, but
agencies have techniques for doing that, at least as general
approximations. On welfarist grounds, and subject to the limitations we
have identified, there is no justification for ignoring the losses that
people experience from morally abhorrent outcomes.
III. APPLICATIONS
It should be clear that the range of potential applications is very wide.
As noted, the EPA has been urged to consider people’s willingness to
pay to protect fish,102 and the Department of the Interior lost in court
when it declined to include existence value as part of the measure of
natural resource damages.103 We explore here an intentionally
heterogeneous assortment of problems, unified above all by one factor:
all of them are intensely practical, in the sense that they involve
questions that agencies have recently been asked to resolve, or that they
will be asked to resolve in the near future.

101

Amartya Sen, Environmental Evaluation and Social Choice: Contingent Valuation and
the Market Analogy, 46 Japanese Econ. Rev. 23, 29–30 (1995).
102
See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
103
See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
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A. Conflict Minerals
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress required the SEC to issue
regulations requiring firms to disclose their use of “conflict minerals,”
which are minerals mined in Congo and other countries where armed
groups fund themselves by managing and extorting mining operations.104
The SEC issued regulations, which were challenged in court by the
National Association of Manufacturers (“NAM”). NAM argued that the
regulations were arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative
Procedure Act and unlawful under the Securities Exchange Act because
the SEC did not conduct an adequate cost-benefit analysis. While the
SEC calculated the cost of the regulations to industry, it did not estimate
the benefits of the regulations, on the ground that it was not feasible to
do so. The court rejected NAM’s argument that the agency’s analysis
was legally insufficient.105
The SEC concluded that the disclosure regime would impose a onetime cost of $3–4 billion on industry and another $207–609 million per
year.106 At the same time, the SEC explained that it was “unable to
readily quantify” the benefits.107 The principal reason did not involve
translating the relevant benefits into monetary equivalents; it involved
the difficulty of knowing what the benefits might be even before
monetization was ventured. The SEC thought that it was impossible to
know whether disclosure would reduce violence in Congo and, if so, by
how much.
The chain of causation was long and complex. Consumers would
need to read or learn about the disclosures; this information would need
to cause them to reduce their purchases from firms that use conflict
minerals; the reduction in demand would need to be sufficient to cause
firms to switch to suppliers of nonconflict minerals; the loss in revenues
to armed groups in Congo would need to cause them to lay down their
arms and negotiate peacefully; and so on. The SEC concluded that any
effort at quantification would be doomed to failure.108 As a matter of
104

See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012).
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 369–70 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
106
Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,334 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240, 249b).
107
Id. at 56,350.
108
Id.
105
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law, it emphasized that Congress had mandated its action and thus, in
effect, determined that the benefits were sufficient by enacting the
law.109
The court upheld the agency’s decision.110 In the court’s view, the
regulation was not required to pass a cost-benefit analysis because
Congress required the regulation whatever the outcome of such an
analysis.111 In any case, the agency did not act unlawfully in concluding
that the moral value of the regulation could not be quantified and put in
monetary terms. The court added:
Even if one could estimate how many lives are saved or rapes
prevented as a direct result of the final rule, doing so would be
pointless because the costs of the rule—measured in dollars—would
create an apples-to-bricks comparison.112

The court was surely on solid ground when it held that the SEC did
not act unlawfully in concluding that it could not estimate the benefits
for people living in Congo. It is possible, on admittedly speculative
assumptions, that the benefits were zero—that the disclosure regime
would have no effect on fighting in Congo, or even a perverse effect by
depriving honest mining operations of revenue, and thus very poor
workers of their wages. It is also possible, also on admittedly speculative
assumptions, that the benefits were very high. In the abstract, and even
after careful exploration of the evidence, it would be difficult to be
confident about the level of benefits.
But that does not resolve the question that concerns us here. Suppose
that many Americans believe that American companies have a moral
obligation not to use conflict minerals in their operations. Or suppose
that many Americans believe that they have a moral obligation not to

109
Id. at 56,335, 56,350 (“In requiring the Commission to promulgate this
rule . . . Congress determined that its costs were necessary and appropriate in furthering the
goals of helping end the conflict in the DRC and promoting peace and security in the DRC.
To the extent the final rule implementing the statute imposes a burden on competition . . . we
believe the burden is necessary and appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of [the
statute].”).
110
See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 748 F.3d at 369–70.
111
See id. at 369 (finding that, because of the social purposes identified by Congress as the
goal of the statute, “the Commission had to promulgate a disclosure rule”).
112
Id.

COPYRIGHT © 2017 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2017]

Moral Commitments in Cost-Benefit Analysis

1843

use products that contain conflict minerals and, therefore, that American
companies should disclose to them whether their products contain
conflict minerals so that Americans can avoid using those products if
they choose to. How should such moral considerations be valued?
Consistent with our analysis, the SEC might have made some effort to
determine how much Americans are willing to pay in relation to these
moral concerns. In the context of this regulation, which is a disclosure
rule, the question is how much Americans benefit from learning that
corporations use conflict minerals or do not use conflict minerals. The
simplest question is: how much would Americans be willing to pay to
receive that information? Survey information could provide a rough
answer to this question. The firms themselves may have information as
well. There are many ways to gain indirect insights. First, do Americans
read or seek access to disclosures of this kind as a general matter?
Second, if Americans learn that a company uses conflict minerals, do
they stop using its products?
We suspect that firms’ opposition to the regulation is based not so
much on the compliance costs as the fear that they will lose sales if
Americans learn about their use of conflict minerals. If so, the SEC
could ask the firms for estimates, grounded in market data, on the likely
effect of the regulation on sales.
It is possible, of course, that the monetized moral benefit of the
regulation is small. Consider an American, named Linda, who pays $420
for a cellphone because it was not manufactured with conflict minerals
rather than $400 for an otherwise identical cellphone that was
manufactured with conflict minerals. We infer that this person is willing
to pay at least $20 to avoid using conflict minerals, but it is also the case
that the person is made worse off to the tune of $20 as a result of the
price increase.113 Yet in the case given, the benefit is not zero; Linda is
better off on net. She prefers the more expensive cellphone. Other
people, like Linda, might believe themselves to be better off if, as a
result of the regulation, products with conflict materials are used less
often. In principle, surveys can be used to estimate the aggregate welfare
benefits of the regulation.
113
For relevant discussion, see Hunt Allcott & Judd B. Kessler, The Welfare Effects of
Nudges: A Case Study of Energy Use Social Comparisons (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 21671, 2015), http://ipl.econ.duke.edu/seminars/system/files/seminars/
1709.pdf [https://perma.cc/S365-P99K].
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What if it turns out that the welfare benefits of regulation are low, $0,
or even negative (including, of course, the benefits to people in Congo)?
Should the SEC refuse to regulate? In view of the statutory requirement,
it is not possible to argue that Congress gave the SEC the choice not to
regulate if net benefits are zero or less. Under the stated assumption, the
better argument is that the SEC must regulate—but that in such
circumstances it should issue the weakest regulation consistent with
Congress’s command. This could mean, for example, that the SEC
should include a de minimis exception, as NAM argued;114 that it should
limit the regulation to companies that manufacture with conflict
minerals rather than encompass companies that contract with
manufacturers that use conflict minerals in production; and so on. And if
the welfare benefits turn out to be high on net, then a maximally
aggressive regulation might turn out to be justified. If all this is correct,
then the SEC should have done more to calculate benefits, to the extent
feasible, and within the requirements of law, and should have chosen a
level of regulatory stringency commensurate with the balance of those
benefits over the costs.
B. GMOs
Many consumers are strongly in favor of mandatory labels for GM
foods.115 In the United States, the public demand, accompanied by
interest-group pressures, has led to a statutory requirement to that
effect.116 The Department of Agriculture is required to issue
implementing regulations in 2018,117 and an analysis of costs and
benefits will have to accompany their issuance.118
Assessment of the benefits will be challenging among multiple
dimensions. Many consumers think that GM food is unsafe or
unhealthy,119 and they want labels for that reason, but the existing
114

See Opening Brief of Appellants at 27–30, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 748 F.3d 359 (No. 135252); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 748 F.3d at 365–66 (discussing and dismissing NAM’s
arguments regarding the necessity of a de minimis exception).
115
See Cass R. Sunstein, Do People Like Nudges?, 68 Admin. L. Rev. 177, 189 (2016).
116
7 U.S.C. § 1639b (Supp. 2017).
117
Id.
118
See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 215 (2012).
119
See Scott et al., supra note 4, at 316.
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evidence suggests that the health concerns are baseless.120 It would not
make much sense to count willingness-to-pay that is based on a mistake
of fact. Many consumers think that GM food creates environmental
risks, and they want labels for that reason.121 The evidence is less
unequivocal here; the consensus appears to be that the risks are
somewhere between zero and very small.122 For regulators, the
appropriate approach is relatively straightforward. If people seek labels
because of a mistaken belief that GM food creates a risk to health or the
environment, their desires should be ignored; the appropriate remedy is
information, not regulation. If they are concerned about a low
probability of harm, the appropriate inquiry involves their willingness to
pay.
For our purposes here, the central issue lies elsewhere. Suppose that
some consumers seek GM labels not because they are fearful of adverse
effects on health or the environment, but because they believe that
genetic modification of food is morally abhorrent. If they are willing to
pay for labels so that they can act on their moral convictions (by
refusing to purchase GM foods), then the proper way to incorporate the
moral commitment into a cost-benefit analysis is to determine the
magnitude of this willingness to pay.
As in the case of conflict minerals, we also need to take into account
how people act once they are informed. If a label causes a person to buy
more expensive or otherwise less desirable food in order to avoid eating
GM food, the consumer welfare loss must be subtracted from the
willingness to pay for the label in order to determine the figure to be
used in the cost-benefit analysis.123 We suspect that, if health and
environmental concerns are put to one side, people would not be willing
to pay much to vindicate their moral commitments with respect to GM
food. What, exactly, would those moral commitments look like? But
perhaps that question has a decent answer.

120
For a summary, see Cass R. Sunstein, On Mandatory Labeling, with Special Reference
to Genetically Modified Foods, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1043, 1072–74 (2017) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Mandatory Labeling].
121
See id. at 1074–75.
122
See id. We are bracketing some scientific disputes here.
123
See Allcott & Kessler, supra note 113, at 2–3.
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The GM controversy raises another distinctive issue. Some people
appear to think that the very idea of GM food is disgusting,124 and while
the evidence is not clear on this point, their disgust might have a strong
moral component. They might think that it is intrinsically wrong to
“tamper with nature.” Let us bracket the question whether it is easy to
make sense of this idea.125 Now the label produces both direct welfare
gains (the avoidance of disgust) as well as gains from the ability to avoid
violating a moral commitment. Both of these gains must be taken into
account.
As before, there is a distinction between a moral conviction,
unaccompanied by welfare effects, and an impact on subjective wellbeing. The latter is what matters. To the extent that people would suffer
without GM labels, and are willing to pay for them to avert that
suffering, their willingness to pay is the appropriate measure. It is also
true that, if people would save money from labels because they could
buy normal food rather than organic food, the cost savings can be used
to approximate their willingness to pay. Eliciting these figures would be
challenging, not least because of segregating the prevailing (and
apparently groundless) fears about health and environmental risks, but in
principle, it is the right thing to do, at least if moral concerns are playing
a substantial role.126
C. Mortality Risks Faced by Children
Some critics of cost-benefit analysis argue that it cannot account for
loss of human life. They claim that risks to human life caused by human
activity—including industry, transportation, and agriculture—trigger
moral concerns that cannot possibly be monetized.127
Notwithstanding the intuitive appeal of this claim, the government
does take into account the welfare effects of loss of human life. It does
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See Sunstein, Mandatory Labeling, supra note 120, at 1077.
See generally James P. Collman, Naturally Dangerous: Surprising Facts About Food,
Health, and the Environment (2001) (emphasizing that people often object to artificial or
unnatural products and prefer natural ones, even if the former are in some cases safer).
126
For qualifications in this complex area, see generally Sunstein, Mandatory Labeling,
supra note 120, at 1074–75 (suggesting that public opposition to GM food is based largely
on unjustified fears of health and environmental risks).
127
See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 27, at 8–9.
125
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so not by monetizing “life,” but by asking about people’s willingness to
pay to eliminate statistical mortality risks.128 Within the federal
government, the value of a statistical life is typically around $9 million,
which reflects evidence that people would be willing to pay about $90 to
eliminate a risk of 1/100,000.129 On the basis of the discussion thus far,
we emphatically agree that an approach of this kind is the right start. If
the government is eliminating statistical risks, it should ask how much
people care about doing so, and, currently, private willingness to pay is
the best way to answer that question.130
But if agencies are concerned about the welfare effects of mortality,
that figure does not capture all of the picture. To give the clearest
example—and one with evident relevance to regulatory policy—mothers
and fathers would pay something to eliminate mortality risks faced by
their children. Indeed, some evidence suggests that parents would be
willing to spend a significant amount to eliminate such risks—perhaps
an amount well in excess of the $90 that most people would spend to
eliminate purely personal risks of 1/100,000.131 Shouldn’t that amount be
included in the analysis? When parents lose a child, they suffer a
grievous welfare loss. There is no justification for refusing to take
account of parents’ willingness to pay to eliminate statistical risks that
their children face.
The standard tools are available to quantify that value.132 In principle,
a figure can be derived from market behavior, including how much
parents spend to buy safety devices that benefit their children.133 To be
sure, the revealed preference information is very noisy, and if that
problem seems decisive, contingent valuation questions might be used
instead. For example, people might be asked, “How much are you
128

See Sunstein, Valuing Life, supra note 31, at 86.
See U.S. Dep’t of Transp., supra note 68, at 1; see also Sunstein, Valuing Life, supra
note 31, at 7, 85–94 (analyzing and challenging prevailing methods of determining the value
of statistical lives).
130
On concerns and objections about willingness to pay to value statistical lives, see
Dorman, supra note 8, at 137–41, and Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Revolution, supra note 61.
131
See Williams, supra note 11, at 69–78. It is true, of course, that parental willingness to
protect children is not rooted solely in moral concerns.
132
See id. at 102–03.
133
See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 537,
574–78 (2005) (discussing studies of revealed preferences for child safety).
129
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willing to pay to avoid having your child be subjected to a mortality risk
of 1/100,000?”134 This question, whose answer should incorporate
anticipated grief, is the same as those that are now used in the context of
regulatory policy.
We acknowledge that the relevant evidence here remains in its
preliminary state; it may be too conjectural for government use. Even so,
entirely disregarding the loss to parents is not defensible. We also
acknowledge that with respect to mortality risks, the logic of our
argument extends far beyond parents. Spouses and siblings, for example,
would pay something to eliminate their loved ones’ mortality risks, and
the same is true of friends and even strangers. With respect to practice,
the case of children seems to be most pressing, but there is a general gap
here in the calculation of benefits. At a minimum, the current figure of
$9 million should be taken as a lower bound insofar as it ignores the
willingness to pay of those other than the victim.
D. Prison Rape
The Prison Rape Elimination Act, enacted in 2003, is designed to
reduce the incidence of rape in prison.135 It requires implementing
regulations from the Department of Justice.136 We have noted that any
such regulations must, via executive order, be accompanied by costbenefit analysis, and indeed the Department produced an extensive
one.137 We acknowledge that any such analysis will be, to many,
extremely uncomfortable in this setting. Drawing on the Department’s
experience, let us explore how our discussion bears on what it actually
did.
Suppose that the cost of a particular rule, designed to reduce the risk
of prison rape, is $500 million. Suppose too that every year, there are
260,000 prison rapes in the United States. How should the Department
of Justice analyze the benefits of its rule and of alternatives to it? It
134

Id. at 569.
42 U.S.C. § 15602 (2012).
136
Id. § 15607.
137
National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 77 Fed. Reg.
37,106, 37,110–11 (June 20, 2012) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 115). Disclosure: Professor
Sunstein was Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs when this
regulation was issued.
135
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seems clear that alternatives, more and less stringent, would increase and
decrease both costs and benefits, suggesting that the analysis would bear
on the ultimate content of the chosen rule.
The assessment of benefits is evidently challenging. In principle, the
Department should try to specify the number of prison rapes that its rule
would prevent and also the monetary value of a case of prevented rape.
If the Department expects to prevent 10,000 rapes, and if each avoided
rape is valued at $500,000, the benefits would be $5 billion—easily
enough to justify the regulation. Of course, the Department would need
to have some basis for those projections. How should regulators assess
the monetary value of reducing prison rape? On the basis of standard
practice for statistical mortality risks, they should ask about valuation of
statistical rape risks. To say the least, that is not the easiest question, and
there is little good data on it. And indeed, the prison rape question is
more particular: how much would prisoners pay to eliminate a 1/x risk
of being raped in prison? Standard theory suggests that that is the right
question, but quite apart from nonwelfarist considerations, we might
doubt that the answer gives an adequate account of the adverse welfare
effects of being raped.
Here is what the Department actually did. It used two methods to
specify the cost of a case of avoided rape.138 First, it relied on a
contingent valuation study that asked citizens, in a particular region of
the United States, how much they would be willing to pay to prevent a
case of rape. That study elicited a value of about $310,000 per adult
victim, reflecting the willingness to pay of “society.”139 Second, it
examined compensation measures from the legal system, finding a value
of about $480,000, with a $675,000 award for juveniles.140 With these
numbers, it generated a range of values for the prevention of prison rape.
The Department did not specify the number of rapes that it expected to
prevent, but it concluded that, if its rule prevented just 1,671 of the
209,400 annual cases of sexual abuse in prison, the benefits of the rule
would exceed its costs.141
138

Id. at 37,110–11, 37,191.
See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Regulatory Impact Assessment for Prison Rape Elimination
Act Final Rule 40–42 (May 17, 2012), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/programs/pdfs/prea_ria.pdf.
140
See id. at 42–54.
141
See National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 77 Fed. Reg. at
37,111.
139
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The $310,000, $480,000, and $675,000 figures raise many questions
and doubts. Does the legal system have reliable grounds for monetizing
rapes? Does it have reliable grounds for concluding the harm from a
rape of a juvenile is greater than the harm from a rape of an adult? For
our purposes, the most important part of the analysis is the attempt to
elicit “society’s” willingness to pay to prevent a case of prison rape. For
the reasons we have offered, a contingent valuation study might well
produce unreliable numbers, and we have no reason to think that
$310,000 accurately reflects the relevant value. But however it is
assessed, the value to prisoners themselves does not capture the full
social value of preventing prison rape. Many people suffer a welfare loss
when prisoners are raped, and they are willing to pay something to
reduce prison rapes. The Department of Justice was entirely correct to
notice that point.
The Department also was confronted with some uncomfortable
questions directly related to our topic here. The contingent valuation
study was based on questions posed to people who lived outside prisons
and so reflected their judgment of the social value of avoiding a rape of
a nonprisoner. The Department noted a potential objection, to the effect
that people might think that a rape of a prisoner is less morally bad than
a rape of someone who has not been convicted of a crime.142 In addition,
it could be argued that people who answered the contingent valuation
questions probably had in mind rapes of women, whereas in prison most
rapes are of men.143 If people think that the rape of a man is morally
different from (not as bad as or worse than) a rape of a woman, then the
study’s numbers are again wrong. The Justice Department refused to
make adjustments, based largely on its view that willingness-to-pay
values should not be reduced on the assumption that society attached a
lower value to preventing harm to inmates.144
We do not offer a judgment about the Department’s approach, which
has evident appeal. But if contingent valuation studies are appropriate
for determining the welfare effects of moral harms, it is not clear why
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U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 139, at 41.
Id. at 42.
144
Id.
143
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regulators should not take account of at least some contextual factors.145
Admittedly, any such effort to do so would raise complex legal and
moral questions: it would almost certainly violate the Equal Protection
Clause to value rapes differently depending on the sex of the victim, and
lower valuation of rapes of people in prison would face constitutional
challenges as well.
E. Access for Disabled People
The Americans with Disabilities Act146 requires employers, owners of
buildings open to the public, and others to provide “accommodations”
for disabled people. The Department of Justice issues regulations under
the Act.147 One such regulation, known as “Water Closet Clearances,”
requires that buildings provide access to people who use wheelchairs,
including in bathrooms, where toilet stalls would need to be widened
and out-swinging doors would be used.148 The agency conducted a costbenefit analysis that monetized the benefits. The Department of Justice
calculated that the average user saves five-and-a-half minutes per use.
Using the average minimum wage of a little less than $10 per hour, and
multiplying by the number of beneficiaries and the frequency with
which they use the restroom, the Department agency estimated total
benefits of $900 million.149
More interestingly, the Department noted that a major effect of the
regulation would be to protect people’s “dignity.”150 In many cases,
wheelchair users would no longer need to undergo the embarrassment
and potential humiliation of asking for assistance in using toilet stalls.
Surely that is a benefit, but to say the least, it is not easy to monetize.
Rather than doing so, the agency performed “breakeven analysis,”

145

Perhaps there is a deontological reason, but that would take us out of the welfarist
framework and require separate discussion.
146
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
147
Id. § 12134(a).
148
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services,
75 Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,169 (Sept. 15, 2010) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35). Disclosure:
Professor Sunstein was Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
when this regulation was finalized.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 56,171.
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asking how much the regulation would need to be worth in order to
produce net benefits.151
It did so in two different ways, calculating (1) how much people who
use wheelchairs would need to be willing to pay152 and (2) how much
people generally would need to be willing to pay. With respect to (2),
the agency concluded that, even if the amount was very low (a matter of
pennies), the benefits would justify the costs.153 The latter is of course
the question on which we are focusing here, and the Department made
considerable progress through the use of breakeven analysis, which is
far better than no analysis at all. But in principle, the agency would have
done better to make some effort to estimate the relevant amount.
F. Climate Change: Foreigners and Future Generations
1. Two acute dilemmas. In most cases of environmental regulation,
the agency (typically the EPA) uses cost-benefit analysis in a relatively
straightforward way to determine the welfare impact of a proposed
regulation. Consider, for example, a regulation to limit the emission of
particulate matter over urban areas. The costs will be borne by affected
industries and ultimately by consumers and workers as well. The
principal benefits usually come from reduced mortality risk, as measured
by the value of a statistical life, but the EPA takes into account other
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For a summary, see Sunstein, Limits of Quantification, supra note 53, at 1387–90.
See Disability Rights Section of the Civil Rights Div., Dep’t of Justice, Final
Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Final Revised Regulations Implementing Titles II and III
of the ADA, Including Revised ADA Standards for Accessible Design 142–43 (2010),
https://www.ada.gov/regs2010/RIA_2010regs/DOJ%20ADA%20Final%20RIA.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P36L-WU7C].
153
The report states:
The second threshold estimate, by contrast, calculates the average monetary value
each American (on a per capita basis) would need to place annually (over a fifteen
year period) on the ‘existence’ of improved accessibility for persons with disabilities
(or the ‘insurance’ of improved accessibility for their own potential use in the future)
in order for the [net present values] for each respective requirement to equal zero.
Under this methodology, if Americans on average placed an ‘existence’ value and/or
‘insurance’ value of between 2 cents on the low end to 7 cents on the high end per
requirement, then the [net present values] for each of these requirements would be
zero. Note that this latter calculation assumes no added value of avoided humiliation,
of increase[d] safety and increased independence.
Id. at 146.
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effects as well, such as the impact of the regulation on morbidity,
recreational opportunities, and even environmental aesthetics.154
In the Obama Administration, many officials participated in a
systematic effort to take into account the problems posed by climate
change.155 Scientists have established that carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases contribute to a long-term atmospheric warming trend,
which will cause various harms around the world, including coastal
flooding. The White House convened an interagency working group that
calculated a social cost of carbon (“SCC”)—the amount of harm per unit
of carbon emitted into the atmosphere.156 This number has been used by
agencies that regulate power plant operations, vehicle emissions, and
other activities that produce greenhouse gases.157 During the Trump
Administration, the working group has been disbanded, but apparently
some number will have to be used to reflect the social cost of carbon.158
For many reasons, calculation of the benefits of greenhouse gas
reductions poses a difficult challenge to regulators; two of those reasons
are highly unusual and of special relevance to our discussion here. First,
greenhouse gas emissions from American sources will cause significant
harm not only to Americans, but also to foreigners. How, if at all, should
those harms be counted? Most normal types of air pollution affect
people living near the source and do not have substantial effects outside
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For a recent illustration in the domain of particulate matter, see EPA, Regulatory
Impact Analysis for the Final Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
Particulate Matter, at ES-10, 6-74 (2012), https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/
finalria.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5NL-SWWE]. For additional examples, see Sunstein,
Valuing Life, supra note 31, at 49, 58–59.
155
See Michael Greenstone et al., Estimating the Social Cost of Carbon for Use in U.S.
Federal Rulemakings: A Summary and Interpretation 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 16913, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16913.pdf [https://perma.cc/
U4S6-CKKH].
156
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Final Rule Technical Support Document (TSD): Energy
Efficiency Program for Commercial and Industrial Equipment: Small Electric Motors 15-14
to 15-18 (2010).
157
Greenstone et al., supra note 155, at 2–3, 22–23.
158
As discussed below, President Trump terminated the Technical Working Group that
calculated the SCC and directed agencies to use standard guidance from the Office of
Management and Budget in Circular A-4. See Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093,
16,095–96 (Mar. 28, 2017); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 55. As of this writing, it
is not clear what figure the Trump Administration will use for the SCC.
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of the territorial boundaries of the United States.159 Second, current
greenhouse gas emissions harm people in the distant future, including
future generations, whereas most other types of pollution cause harm to
people alive today, while long-term effects are minimal.
During the Obama Administration, the government’s SCC was
unambiguously and unapologetically welfarist in two respects. First, it
treated foreigners the same as it treats Americans. Second, and less
controversially, it treated future generations the same as current
generations, in the sense that it used a discount rate that was not
intended to give less weight to their welfare than to that of current
generations.160 It appears that the Trump Administration will not give
(any) weight to adverse welfare effects on foreigners, though this issue,
and the relevant discount rate, remain to be specified.161
It is true, of course, that if Congress explicitly commands the agency
to consider only the welfare of Americans or to consider the welfare of
foreigners and Americans alike, then the agency must heed the
command.162 If Congress does not, and if it grants discretion to the
agency, the agency’s conclusion will depend on its political, strategic,
and moral judgments.163 A possible view, apparently that of the Trump
159

For an example of another regulation that affected foreigners, see Medical Examination
of Aliens—Removal of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Infection From Definition of
Communicable Disease of Public Health Significance, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,547 (Nov. 2, 2009)
(codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 34). The agency mentioned the benefits to foreigners but did not
monetize them. Id. at 56,556–57 (“Depending on the region of the world from which a
person emigrates, admittance to the U.S. may afford greater opportunity, better health care,
and education and training programs than those available in the immigrant’s home country.
These HIV-infected individuals, compared to those who do not receive appropriate multidrug antiretroviral therapy for HIV treatment, could survive an additional 13 years, with an
average life expectancy of approximately 29 years (to age 49 years).” (citing The
Antiretroviral Therapy Cohort Collaboration, Life Expectancy of Individuals on
Combination Antiretroviral Therapy in High-Income Countries: A Collaborative Analysis of
14 Cohort Studies, 372 Lancet 293 (2008))). For a discussion of several regulations, see
Arden Rowell & Lesley Wexler, Valuing Foreign Lives, 48 Ga. L. Rev. 499, 524–39 (2014).
160
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra note 156, at §§ 15A.4.2, 15A.4.6.
161
See Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. at 16,096.
162
Many environmental statutes were apparently intended to benefit Americans only. See
Ronald Fein, Note, Should the EPA Regulate Under TSCA and FIFRA to Protect Foreign
Environments from Chemicals Used in the United States?, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2153, 2169–70
(2003).
163
For a discussion, see Posner & Sunstein, supra note 133, at 581–84; see also Rowell &
Wexler, supra note 159, at 524–39 (providing examples from various regulatory contexts).
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Administration, is that agencies should focus only on Americans
because any government owes its sole responsibility to its own
citizens.164 Another possible view, as noted above, is that moral claims
are universal and that agencies should treat foreigners and Americans
alike unless forbidden to do so by Congress.
On pure welfarist grounds, this view has considerable appeal. Yet
another view is that agencies should consider the welfare of foreigners if
and only if doing so would ultimately prove helpful to Americans—as it
might if, for example, it produced a degree of reciprocity through
greenhouse gas rules, from other nations, that ultimately benefit
Americans.165 The simplest version of this argument is that, unless the
United States considers the welfare of foreigners, other nations will not
consider the welfare of Americans, and so consideration of foreigners by
the United States helps to solve an international prisoners’ dilemma.
2. Willingness to pay—for foreigners. How should agencies address
these two populations—the foreign population and the future
population? In the abstract, the answer to the first question depends in
the first instance on whether agencies should maximize the well-being of
Americans only, or everyone around the world. Arguments have been
made for a variety of approaches.166
We do not take a stand on the largest issues here. Our particular
argument, based on the analysis thus far, is much narrower: whether or
not agencies should focus solely on Americans, the cost-benefit analysis
should include foreigners in a derivative fashion—to the extent that
Americans care about foreigners, which can be monetized with
willingness-to-pay methods. Many Americans have strong personal
164
This seems implicit in the guidance of Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093,
which specifically instructs the agencies to adhere to OMB Circular A-4 when monetizing
the “domestic versus international impacts” of changes in greenhouse gas emissions
resulting from regulations. Id. at 16,096. OMB Circular A-4 clearly states, “[Agency]
analysis should focus on benefits and cost that accrue to citizens and residents of the United
States.” Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 55, at 15. Any international effects are to be
considered and reported “separately.” Id. For a defense of this position, see Ted Gayer & W.
Kip Viscusi, Determining the Proper Scope of Climate Change Policy Benefits in U.S.
Regulatory Analyses: Domestic Versus Global Approaches, 10 Rev. Envtl. Econ. & Pol’y
245 (2016).
165
Peter Howard & Jason Schwartz, Think Global: International Reciprocity as
Justification for a Global Social Cost of Carbon, 42 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 203, 210 (2017).
166
For a discussion of that literature, see Rowell & Wexler, supra note 159, at 504–22.
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attachments to foreigners (who can include friends and relatives), and
many also care a lot, or at least a little bit, about the well-being of
foreigners who are strangers. Some kind of empirical analysis would be
necessary to test whether the derivative value is large or small. What we
are adding is that it must be taken into account.167
3. Willingness to pay—for future generations. The appropriate
treatment of future populations raises many challenges, often discussed
under the rubric of appropriate discount rates.168 The impact of most
ordinary regulations will be mainly felt by people who are alive today.
Thus, the welfare impact is direct, and can be easily and
uncontroversially determined by applying the usual discount rate (under
Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) guidance, 3% or 7%169) to
future effects.
By contrast, greenhouse gas regulation will mainly affect people who
are not alive today.170 The effect on future populations is akin to the
effect on foreign populations: the case for regulation may be based on
moral considerations independent of direct welfare impacts on current
generations of Americans. If agencies should be thoroughgoing
welfarists and focus on everyone, the cost-benefit analysis should take
account of impacts on future generations to the same extent as
Americans.
We have considerable sympathy for this view, but we do not take a
position on the large question of how to distribute resources equitably
across generations.171 Our point is narrower: whether or not agencies
should focus solely on the current generation or should take account of
future generations as well, the cost-benefit analysis should include
future generations in a derivative fashion: to the extent that Americans

167
A somewhat paradoxical implication is that, if the statute requires the agency to take
into account directly the well-being of foreigners, then the welfare analysis should take
account of Americans in a derivative fashion (as well as in direct fashion), to the extent that
foreigners care about Americans! On double-counting, see supra note 91.
168
See William Nordhaus, The Climate Casino: Risk, Uncertainty, and Economics for a
Warming World 186 (2013).
169
See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 55, at 33–34.
170
We do not mean to deny that climate change is having current effects; the point is that
regulation of current emissions will principally benefit future generations.
171
See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Nicolas Treich, Prioritarianism and Climate Change, 62
Envtl. & Resource Econ. 279, 294–95 (2015).
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wish to protect future generations, their desire should be counted, and it
can be elicited with willingness-to-pay methods. Many Americans do
care, at least a little, about the well-being of people in the distant future.
Here, as elsewhere, an empirical analysis is needed to determine their
willingness to pay for the well-being of future generations, so that this
amount can be used in cost-benefit analysis of climate regulations.
IV. LAW
We have argued that, when agencies conduct cost-benefit analysis of
regulations, they should use valuations that reflect how much people are
willing to pay to see their moral beliefs vindicated or to reduce the level
of psychological harm they feel if those beliefs are not vindicated. Now
we ask how this principle interacts with law.
A. Executive Enforcement
Executive Order 13,563172 requires agencies to conduct cost-benefit
analysis of major regulations. Section 1(c) also provides:
Where appropriate and permitted by law, each agency may consider
(and discuss qualitatively) values that are difficult or impossible to
quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive
impacts.173

Under Executive Order 13,563, willingness to pay to protect moral
values can be taken into account through two different routes. The first
is cost-benefit analysis itself. For reasons we have given, willingness to
pay to protect moral commitments should be considered under the
standard framework. The second involves Section 1(c), which authorizes
agencies to consider a range of moral values. To be sure, Section 1(c)
emphasizes the difficulty of quantifying such values, but our suggestion
here is that that difficulty can be overcome.
It is possible to go further. If our argument is correct, the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs should, in appropriate cases,
encourage or require agencies to consider and (to the extent feasible) to
monetize the moral effects of regulation and to use the valuations in
172
173

Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 215 (2012).
Id. at 216.
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cost-benefit analyses of regulations. Most formally, this could be
accomplished through a revision of the guidance document that
implements the cost-benefit mandate,174 or more realistically through
informal give-and-take.
B. Judicial Enforcement
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts are required to
invalidate regulations that are “arbitrary [and] capricious.”175 Courts
must also strike down a regulation when it is inconsistent with the
organic statute under which the agency issued the regulation. In some
cases, courts have struck down regulations for failing a cost-benefit
analysis, based on one or both sources of law.176 As we have noted, the
Supreme Court has also indicated that, even when the organic statute
provides only broad guidance to the regulator (for example, requiring
the agency to regulate when “appropriate or necessary”), the agency
must consider costs, and that it may not regulate if the costs
“significantly” exceed the benefits.177
While the law is not settled, these cases appear to impose an
obligation on agencies to conduct some kind of cost-benefit analysis of
regulations except when a statute forbids it.178 On one view, not yet
endorsed by the Supreme Court, the requirement of nonarbitrariness
means that agencies must monetize costs and benefits, and refrain from
issuing a regulation if the costs exceed the benefits, unless they can
provide a good reason for believing that the costs and benefits cannot be

174

See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 55.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
176
Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1149–51 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Corrosion Proof
Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1213, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991); see generally Caroline Cecot &
W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency Benefit-Cost Analysis, 22 Geo. Mason L. Rev.
575 (2015) (analyzing judicial review of benefit-cost analysis across thirty-eight judicial
decisions).
177
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015).
178
See Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, supra note 41, at 15;
Jonathan Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role (U. Chi.,
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law & Econ. Paper No. 794, 2017),
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2456&context=law_and_ec
onomics. For a different view, see Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality
Review, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 1355, 1375–83 (2016).
175
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monetized fully or at all.179 If it is appropriately deferential, judicial
review can prevent agencies from manipulating cost-benefit analyses to
achieve political ends and ensure that agencies avoid common errors,
particularly in the form of disregarding or underplaying important
benefits or costs.
It is possible to believe that the “moral effects” of a regulation are just
the type that cannot be monetized. As we have noted, some agencies
appear to hold this view, as in the case of an important regulation from
the Department of Transportation, designed among other things to
protect children from the risk of backover crashes.180 In that case,
however, the agency at least recognized parents’ values and took them
into account.181 A minimal submission, based on our argument here, is
that it was legally required to do exactly that: a complete failure to
consider those values would have been arbitrary. If we are correct that
the moral effects of a regulation can and should be monetized, then the
failure to monetize them could be sufficient grounds for a court to strike
down a regulation, at least if doing so is feasible.
Support for this view can be found in Ohio v. Department of the
Interior.182 Recall that in that case, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit struck down a regulation that calculated
compensation for victims of spills and leaks of hazardous substances
that damaged natural resources. The Department of the Interior had
limited compensation to “use value,” that is, market damages, and
excluded “existence value” except when use value could not be
determined. Existence value refers to the value that people attach to
protection of resources that they do not expect to use.183 By excluding

179
For an elaboration of this view, see Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness
Review, supra note 41, at 33–36. For a related view, see Masur & Posner, supra note 178, at
34–35.
180
See supra note 23 and accompanying text. We have noted that, to the extent that parents
are willing to pay to protect their children, it is not only because of a moral commitment.
181
See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Rear Visibility 79 Fed. Reg. 19,178,
19,235–36 (Apr. 7, 2014) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
182
880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
183
Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 269, 285–86
(1989) (“[H]umans may obtain ‘vicarious value’ from natural resources. Even if I never
intend to visit Yosemite National Park, I may still value its preservation. The knowledge that
a given natural environment is protected is valuable to some Americans, and vicarious
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existence value from the calculation of damages when a use value could
also be determined, the Department of the Interior regulation would
have undercompensated people on account of moral harms.
While the court’s ruling was based in part on its interpretation of the
underlying statute,184 its conclusion that people may be injured by the
destruction of existence value—a subcategory of what we have called
moral effects—may be generalizable. An inadequately explained failure
to consider existence value would be arbitrary as a matter of law, at least
if the agency has discretion to do so.
CONCLUSION
In many respects, the regulatory state has become a cost-benefit state,
in the sense that agencies must catalogue costs and benefits before
proceeding, and in general, must show that the benefits justify the costs.
After years of experience, agencies have well-established tools for
valuing risks to health, safety, and the environment. Sometimes,
however, regulations are designed to protect third parties or otherwise to
promote moral values, and agencies have struggled to quantify their
benefits; often they ignore them.
Our principal submission here has been that people often care about
such values, and they suffer a welfare loss when they are compromised.
If so, the best way to measure that loss is through eliciting private
willingness to pay. To be sure, the principal reason to protect moral
values is to do exactly that, and not to prevent the welfare loss to those
who care about them. But that loss unquestionably matters, and in some
cases, it might turn out to be very large. There is no justification for
agencies to ignore it.

appreciation of nature, therefore, has a demonstrable economic value.”). This article was
cited by the court in Ohio v. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 464.
184
Ohio v. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 463–64.
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